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Locating Justice Pal: TWAIL, International Criminal Tribunals, and Judicial Powers
Sujith XAVIER
University of Windsor, Faculty of Law, Canada
sxavier@uwindsor.ca
Abstract
This paper brings forward Justice Pal’s dissenting opinion at the Tokyo Tribunal to add to the TWAIL literature
on international criminal law and examine the rules of evidence and procedure. It is part of a TWAIL effort to
scrutinize the everyday practices of international prosecutions through procedural and evidentiary rules. By
locating and situating Justice Pal’s reason within the broader academic literature on dissents in international
criminal law, it is possible to illustrate how and why Justice Pal’s views were obscured as a relevant dissent.
From this vantage point, this paper pursues Justice Pal’s legacy as it relates to the rules of evidence and
procedure in the ICTY and ICTR. It traces the evolution of the judicial power to draft and amend the rules and
examines the impact of these decisions on the everyday functions of the tribunals and how truth is determined.

As the Indian judge on the Tokyo Tribunal,1 Justice Radhabinod Pal was one of the first jurists
from the Global South to be appointed to an international criminal tribunal. Justice Pal’s dissent
is a “largely forgotten” critique of international criminal law. The importance given to
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal) further reinforces the
obfuscation of Justice Pal’s dissent.2 In fact, Justice Pal is “an outsider to international criminal
law, and his visceral critique of the institutionalization of this system reveals the deep roots of
third-world resistance.”3 Justice Pal’s approximately 1200 paged dissent is significant, especially
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1 Commonly known as the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). I use the Tokyo Tribunal in the
remainder of this paper.
2 Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER, “‘Introduction’” in Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER, eds., Documents on
the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), xxxiii at xxxiii [Boister and Cryer, “Introduction”]; for recent attempts to examine the history and implications
of Tokyo Tribunal, see generally Yuki TANAKA, Tim MCCORMACK, and Gerry SIMPSON, “Editors Preface” in
Yuki TANAKA, Tim MCCORMACK, and Gerry SIMPSON, eds., Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes
Trial Revisited (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), xxvii at xxvii–xxxi; Kirsten Sellars, “Imperfect
Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo” (2010) 21:4 European Journal of International Law 1085; for a Japanese perspective
on Justice Pal, see Nakajima TAKESHI, “Justice Pal (India)” in Yuki TANAKA, Tim MCCORMACK, and Gerry
SIMPSON, eds., Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2011), 127 at 127; Sumedha CHOUDHURY, “Contextualising Radhabinod Pal's Dissenting Opinion in
Contemporary International Criminal Law” (2021) Asian Journal of International Law 1-9 [Choudhury,
“Contextualising Pal”].
3 Rohini SEN and Rashmi RAMAN, “Retelling Radha Binod Pal: The Outsider and The Native” in Frédéric MÉGRET
and Immi TALLGREN, eds., The Dawn of a Discipline: International Criminal Justice and Its Early Exponents
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 230 at 233.

as international criminal law continues to encounter staunch criticisms of its own Eurocentricity4
and reproduction of Western legal normativity.5
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) offers a central challenge to
international law’s Eurocentricity. Broadly, TWAIL argues that international law is the
handmaiden of colonialism and imperialism, which is built on racial hierarchies and double
standards.6 TWAIL scholars maintain that these architectures of exclusion nonetheless persist in
various locations, including settler colonial milieus.7 While TWAIL critiques of international
criminal law may have started in 2003,8 there is a concerted effort to expose this dynamic field’s
“idealization of Western liberal criminal law fused with a transcendentally utopian ethos …”9 Asad
Kiyani and other scholars have pushed to expose the double standards prevalent in the selection of
international criminal cases10 and various “operational selectivity” mechanisms of the
International Criminal Court (ICC).11 Other TWAIL scholars have challenged the ways in which
post-colonial states have deployed the ICC as a means to “redefine” their internal armed conflict.12
As astutely pointed out by Vasuki Nesiah, local voices are used by international criminal
institutions to justify their pursuits of international justice.13 In this expanding body of scholarly
engagement,14 the focus is on the more recent international criminal institutions and on broad
conceptual concerns that examine the application of the doctrines of international criminal law,15
4Asad

KIYANI, John REYNOLDS, and Sujith XAVIER, “Foreword” (2016) 14:4 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 915–20; John REYNOLDS and Sujith XAVIER, “‘The Dark Corners of the World’: TWAIL and International
Criminal Justice” (2016) 14:4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 959; Obiora Chinedu OKAFOR and
Uchechukwu NGWABA, “The International Criminal Court as a ‘Transitional Justice’ Mechanism in Africa: Some
Critical Reflections” (2015) 9:1 International Journal of Transitional Justice 90; Choudhury, “Contextualising Pal”
supra note 2.
5 See for example, Sujith XAVIER, “Theorising Global Governance Inside Out: A Response to Professor Ladeur”
(2012) 3:3 Transnational Legal Theory 268 [Xavier, “Theorising Global Governance Inside Out”].
6 Makau MUTUA, “What is TWAIL” (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 31 [Mutua,
“What is TWAIL”].
7 Antony ANGHIE, “Foreword: Welcoming the TWAIL Review” (2020) 1 Third World Approaches to International
Law Review 1 at 2; Sujith XAVIER and Jeffery G HEWITT, “Introduction: Decolonizing Law in the Global North
and South: Expanding the Circle” in Sujith XAVIER, Beverley JACOBS et al, eds., Decolonizing Law: Indigenous,
Third World and Settler Perspectives (Milton, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2021), 1.
8 Antony ANGHIE and B. S. CHIMNI, “Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility
in Internal Conflicts” (2003) 2:1 Chinese Journal of International Law 77.
9 Asad G. KIYANI, “Third World Approaches to International Criminal Law” (2015) 109 American Journal of
International Law 255 at 255.
10 Asad G. KIYANI, “Group-Based Differentiation and Local Repression: The Custom and Curse of Selectivity”
(2016) 14:4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 939 [Kiyani, “Group-Based Differentiation”].
11 Reynolds and Xavier, supra note 4.
12 Parvathi MENON, “Self-Referring to the International Criminal Court: A Continuation of War by Other Means”
(2015) 109 American Journal of International Law 260.
13 Vasuki NESIAH, “Local Ownership of Global Governance” (2016) 14:4 Journal of International Criminal Justice
985 [Nesiah, “Local Ownership”].
14 Victor KATTAN, “Palestinian Scholarship and the International Criminal Court’s Blind Spot” (20 February 2020),
online: TWAILR <https://twailr.com/palestinian-scholarship-and-the-international-criminal-courts-blind-spot/>.
Noura ERAKAT and John REYNOLDS, “We Charge Apartheid? Palestine and the International Criminal Court”
TWAILR (20 April 2021), online: TWAILR <https://twailr.com/we-charge-apartheid-palestine-and-the-internationalcriminal-court/>.
15 Asad G. KIYANI, “Al-Bashir & the ICC: The Problem of Head of State Immunity” (2013) 12:3 Chinese Journal
of International Law 467; Christopher GEVERS, “Prosecuting the Crime Against Humanity of Apartheid: Never,
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the histories of international criminal law,16 and institutional practices.17 Precursors of TWAIL’s
animating ethos however can be found much earlier in the dissenting views of Justice Pal. To this
point, James Gathii characterised Justice Pal’s dissent “as forming part of the resistance towards
projections of both metropolitan power and authority over third world peoples.”18 TWAIL scholars
writing about international criminal law have also taken note of the “TWAIL sensibility” of Justice
Pal’s dissent.19
In this paper, I seek to contribute to this field by bringing forward the continued relevance of
Justice Pal’s dissenting reasons in the prosecution of the Japanese war criminals by the Tokyo
Tribunal in 1948.20 This paper moves beyond the conceptual and institutional TWAIL critiques of
international criminal law. In particular, the central purpose is to bring forward Justice Pal’s largely
ignored views on the Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(Tokyo Tribunal Rules) and the Tokyo Tribunal’s evidentiary rules as set out in article 13 of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter (Tokyo Tribunal Charter).21 It is part of a
TWAIL based effort to scrutinize the everyday practices of international prosecutions through the
various rules of evidence and procedure.22 In this vein, I examine the recently completed work of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and their respective rules of evidence and procedure to illustrate the
continued -importance of Justice Pal’s dissent.
In the first section of this paper, Justice Pal’s reasoning is located and situated within the broader
academic literature on dissents in international law, and in particular international criminal law.
This is to illustrate how and why Justice Pal’s reasons were obscured both as a useful dissent and
as a site of scholarly engagement. I then locate Justice Pal within the earlier precursor to TWAIL,
Again”
(2019)
African
Yearbook
of
International
Humanitarian
Law,
online:
<https://www.academia.edu/39736593/Prosecuting_the_Crime_Against_Humanity_of_Apartheid_Never_Again>.
16 Vasuki NESIAH, “The Law of Humanity Has a Canon: Translating Racialized World Order into ‘Colorblind’ Law”
PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review (15 November 2020), online: PoLAR: Political and Legal
Anthropology Review <https://polarjournal.org/2020/11/15/the-law-of-humanity-has-a-canon-translating-racializedworld-order-into-colorblind-law/>.
17 Nesiah, “Local Ownership”, supra note 13.
18 James T. GATHII, “TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative
Bibliography” (2011) 3:1 Trade Law and Development 26 at 35.; Elizabeth Koppleman recognized Justice Pal as a
“[p]recursor to Third World Perspectives on International Law” in 1990, see Elizabeth S KOPELMAN, “Ideology
and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial” (1990) 23:2 New York
University Journal of International Law and Politics 373 at 428.
19 Kiyani, Reynolds, and Xavier, supra note 4 at 918.
20 While there are different available versions of Justice Pal’s dissent, for ease of reference, I have relied on the Boister
and Cryer’s compilation of the documents of the Tokyo Tribunal; “Judgment of The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Pal, Member
from India” in Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 809 [Boister and Cryer, “Judgment of Justice Pal”]; for a recent intervention
arguing for the continued relevance of Justice Pal for international criminal law, see Choudhury, “Contextualising
Pal” supra note 2.
21 “Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (25 April 1946)” in Neil BOISTER and
Robert CRYER, eds., Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12 [Boister and Cryer, “Tokyo Tribunal Rules”]; “Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (as amended-26 April 1946)” in Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER,
eds., Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 7 [Boister and Cryer, “Tokyo Tribunal Charter”].
22 Sujith XAVIER, “Learning from Below: Theorising Global Governance Through Ethnographies and Critical
Reflections from the Global South” (2017) 33:3 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 229.
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or what is now characterised as TWAIL I scholarship to contextualize his views. The second and
final section of this paper pursues Justice Pal’s legacy as it relates to the rules of evidence and
procedure in subsequent international criminal tribunals. This section first traces the evolution of
the judicial power to draft and amend the rules of evidence and procedure from Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals and then examines the impact of these judicial power on the everyday functions
of the ICTY and ICTR and how they determined truth. The ICTY and ICTR two are instances
where the ICC does not have jurisdiction and the international community is seeking a different
means of arriving at “justice.”23
Throughout this project, I have remained hopeful that the victims of mass violence can seek
redress and overcome the impunity of the perpetrators through some form of international criminal
justice in situations like Syria, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka.24 When and if the international
community does create an ad hoc tribunal (or something similar), greater attention must be had to
the construction and amendment of the various evidentiary and procedural rules. While remaining
hopeful and revisiting the work of Justice Pal, I cannot ignore the recent challenges to Western
notions of justice, punishment, and the carceral state, wrought on by social movements like
“Movements for Black Lives” and “Idle No More.”25
I.

LOCATING JUSTICE PAL’S RADICAL DISSENT: CONTEXT AND RECEPTION

A special proclamation by General Douglas MacArthur created the Tokyo Tribunal based on the
Allies’ declarations and the instrument of Japanese surrender.26 The Tokyo Tribunal Charter and
the Tokyo Tribunal Rules were “approved and issued” by General MacArthur. These rules were
modelled on Nuremberg and they set out the jurisdiction, the applicable crimes, and other
necessary components of Western based adjudicatory processes. 27 General MacArthur more or
23

See for example Sujith XAVIER, “Looking for ‘Justice’ in all the Wrong Places: Creating an International or
Hybrid Criminal Tribunal for Sri Lanka?” in Amarnath AMARASINGAM and Daniel BASS eds., Sri Lanka : The
Struggle for Peace in the Aftermath of War (Oxford University Press/London: Hurst Publication, 2017), 53 [Xavier,
“Looking for ‘Justice’”]; Stephanie NEBEHAY, “Step Up Trials of Alleged Syrian War criminals, U.N. Rights Chief
Says” Reuters (11 March 2021), online: Reuters <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-anniversary-unidUSKBN2B31D2>.
24 For an excellent critique of the hopefulness in TWAIL, see Asad G. KIYANI, “Afghanistan & the Surrender of
International Criminal Justice” TWAILR (16 September 2019), online: TWAILR <https://twailr.com/afghanistan-thesurrender-of-international-criminal-justice/> [Kiyani, “Afghanistan”]. See also Karin MICKELSON, “Hope in a
TWAIL Register” (2020) 1 Third World Approaches to International Law Review 14, online (pdf): TWAIL Review
<https://twailr.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Mickelson-Hope-in-a-TWAIL-Register.pdf>.
25 On western notions of justice, see Sylvia MCADAM, Nationhood Interrupted: Revitalizing Nêhiyaw Legal Systems
(Saskatoon, SK, Canada: Purich Publishing Limited, 2015); on justice, punishment and carceral state, see Ruth Wilson
GILMORE, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California (California: University
of California Press, 2007); Rinaldo WALCOTT, On Property: Policing, Prisons, and the Call for Abolition (Windsor,
Ontario: Biblioasis, 2021).
26 For an in-depth discussion of the Allies reasons for prosecution, including the various legal instruments, see Boister
and Cryer, “Introduction” supra note 2 at xxxv; Johannes FUCHS and Flavia LATTANZI, “International Military
Tribunals” in Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law (NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 27 at para 13.
27See generally Yuma TOTANI, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008) at 24–32; the Charter was based on a policy document drafted by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and presented to the Allied governments in mid-October 1945; Fuchs and
Lattanzi, supra note 26 at para 21.
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less “rubber stamped” the appointment of 11 judges from the allied nations, including three judges
from Global South “Asiatic” countries.28 The indictment against the 28 accused major war
criminals was deposited with the Tribunal on 29 April 1946 and the trial quickly commenced on
3 May 1946.29 As a condition of surrender, the Japanese Emperor was not prosecuted.30 The 28
defendants were indicted on charges related to crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity as set out in the Tokyo Tribunal Charter, comprising of “fifty-five counts
grouped into three categories.”31
Two and half years later, having heard 419 witness testimonies and reviewed 4335 exhibits and
779 witness affidavits, the Tribunal rendered the majority decision on 4 November 1948.32 It was
not a unanimous decision, as previously hoped. It included Justice Bernard (from France) and
Justice Pal’s dissents, Justice Roling of Netherlands’ partial dissent, a separate opinion by the
President of the Tribunal, Justice Webb of Australia, and a concurring opinion by Justice Jaranilla
of the newly independent Commonwealth of the Philippines.33 Justice Jaranilla was in a unique
position as he was a victim of the Japanese violence and viewed the prosecution and punishment
of Japanese from a drastically different perspective than Justice Pal.34 Justice Cramer of the United
States took control of the “seven member majority drafting committee” and Justice Webb’s
influence on the majority decision remains uncertain.35 There was intrigue and drama in drafting
of the majority decision, where Justice Webb objected to the role of the military assistants of
Justice Cramer and did not approve of the use of capital punishment.36 In the end, General
MacArthur confirmed the Tribunal’s decision to sentence seven of the accused to death37 and the
remaining were given varying prison sentences.38 The defence counsel nonetheless sought to
28 Nine judges hailed from the signatory states to the Japanese Surrender from Australia, Canada, China, France, New

Zealand, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union and two remaining judges
were from former colonies of India and Philippines.
29 Boister and Cryer, “Introduction”, supra note 2 at lix.
30 It was believed that the emperor would ultimately face the will of his people; Yoriko OTOMO, “The Decision Not
to Prosecute the Emperor” in Yuki TANAKA, Tim MCCORMACK and Gerry SIMPSON, eds., Beyond Victor’s
Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 63. See also
Totani, supra note 27 at 43–62. Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A
Reappraisal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 21 [Boister and Cryer, Tokyo International Military
Tribunal].
31 Indictments were filed against 28 accused but two died during the proceedings and Shumei Okawa was discharged
for mental health reasons; Boister and Cryer, “Judgment of Justice Pal”, supra note 20 at 811 para 2. Another accused
was admitted to a psychiatric facility; Robert CRYER, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the
International Criminal Law Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 42.
32 Boister and Cryer, “Introduction”, supra note 2 at lix.
33 Ibid., at lxix–lxx.
34 “Concurring Opinion by the Honourable Mr. Justice Delfin Jaranilla, Member from the Republic of the Philippines”
in Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER, eds., Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter,
Indictment and Judgments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 642. See also Kopelman, supra note 18 at 391.
35 Boister and Cryer, “Introduction”, supra note 2 at lxviii.
36 Justice Webb is noted as remarking “[i]t may prove revolting to hang or shoot such old men”; Ibid., at lxxv; see
also recent dramatization of The Tokyo Trial, 2016, Netflix app, (Tokyo: NHK; Amsterdam: FATT Productions;
Toronto: Don Cormandy Television, 2016), online (video): <https://www.netflix.com/ca/title/80091880>.
37 Fujita HAISAKAZU, “The Tokyo Trial: Humanity’s Justice v Victors’ Justice” in Yuki TANAKA, Tim
MCCORMACK, and Gerry SIMPSON, eds., Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Leiden,
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 3 at 8.
38 Boister and Cryer, “Introduction”, supra note 2 at lxxxii.
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appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court however declined to grant
leave on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction. Notedly, there was an important dissent by Justice
Douglas.39
Of the three full and partial dissenting opinions of the Tokyo Tribunal, Justice Pal’s reasons
outlined the problem with Western universalism embedded within the majority decision.40 This
led Justice Pal to conclude that the “accused must be found not guilty of each and every one of the
charges in the indictment and should be acquitted of all those charges.”41 He viewed the
prosecution of the Japanese accused as an act of “vindictive retaliation” and an exercise in victors’
justice.42 For Justice Pal, the American exemption from prosecution for the atomic bombing of
Japan, general colonial aggression and territorial annexation by the Allies rendered any attempts
to punish the Japanese as vindictive retaliation. More importantly, he was highly critical of the
decision to mandate the Tribunal to prosecute undefined and retroactive crimes.43 When it was
time to render the judgment, Justice Pal’s request to read out his dissent was denied.44 Yet the “US
censors [attempts] to supress the dissenting judgment” were not successful and the “existence of
the split was revealed” to the Japanese people.45 The dissent however was not published along
with the judgment,46 resurfacing a few years later.
In section, I will first contextualize Justice Pal’s view within the burgeoning literature on
dissents in international law. I offer this discussion to demonstrate how the rediscovery of the
Tokyo Tribunal and Justice Pal’s dissent is unusual, even within international criminal law. Said
another way, even though there is a recognized practice of engaging with dissenting views of
international judges, the field of international criminal law has obscured the relevance of Justice
Pal’s dissent. To reinforce this point, I will explore the curious characterization of Justice Pal’s
dissent by both academic and non-academic commentary within international criminal law after
the rediscovery of the Tokyo Tribunal some 45 years later. I will then juxtapose how scholars with
a Third World sensibility have sought to recover Justice Pal’s dissent, notwithstanding the
exclusion by international criminal law scholars. While it is important to recover Justice Pal, it is
also worthwhile to point out some of the challenges embedded within his reasons. In this vein, I
locate Justice Pal as part of the “first generation of post-colonial international lawyers” and I
demonstrate the importance of Justice Pal for TWAIL in the context of international criminal law,
albeit while taking note of the controversies in his dissent.47
39

For a discussion on Hirota, Stephen I VLADECK, “Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and
Article III” (2007) 95:5 Georgetown Law Journal 1497; Hirota v MacArthur 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
40 Kopelman, supra note 18 at 403.
41 Boister and Cryer, “Judgment of Justice Pal”, supra note 20 at 1422 para 1226.
42 Ibid., at 829-30, para 1233.
43 Ibid., at 829, para 42; Justice Pal states: “To say that the victor can define a crime at his will and then punish for
that crime would be to revert back to those days when he was allowed to devastate the occupied country with fire and
sword, appropriate all public and private property therein, and kill the inhabitants or take them away into captivity.
When international law will have to allow a victor nation thus to define a crime at his will, it will […] find itself back
on the same spot whence it started on its apparently onward journey several centuries ago.”
44 Boister and Cryer, “Introduction”, supra note 2 at lxix.
45 Ibid.
46 Gerry SIMPSON, “Writing the Tokyo Trial” in Yuki TANAKA, Tim MCCORMACK, and Gerry SIMPSON, eds.,
Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011),
23 at 27.
47 Anghie and Chimni, supra note 8 at 79.
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A. Locating Justice Pal’s Decision Among Dissents in International Law and International
Criminal Law
Dissents play a crucial role in charting the future of legal normativity within specific fields of law
in national jurisdictions.48 There is no universal practice of including dissenting views in
international courts and tribunals49 and subsequently there is no consensus on their usefulness.50
Some international and regional courts allow for dissents while others do not. For instance, the
European Court of Justice does not disclose the voting records, while the International Court of
Justice and other courts have a significant history of dissents.51 There is a fascinating history of
the politics of dissents reaching as far back as to the debates on creating the Permanent
International Court of Justice.52 This prompted R.P Anand to reflect on the necessity of allowing
international judges to dissent, given the complex, “imprecise, fragmentary, uncertain and
controversial” nature of international law.53 Importantly, he suggested:
There is no use suppressing these differences. When judges do not agree, it is a sign that they are dealing with
subjects on which society itself is divided. It is the democratic way to express dissident views. The right to
speak is the “fortress of the personality of the free judge” and that is the reason judges attach greatest
importance to this sacred right. Judges should be honoured rather than criticised for following that tradition
and proclaiming their differences so that all may read.54

Within international criminal law, dissents can be deployed for a variety of purposes.
Sometimes described as the “paradox of dissent”, the politics of dissents of international criminal
courts and tribunals oscillate between maintaining the legitimacy of an institution to promoting
judicial dialogue.55 Dissents can be straightforward disagreements with the majority’s view on a
specific doctrine. In exceptional circumstances, dissents can take on a fundamental character.56
Building on these typologies, some dissents within the international criminal law jurisprudence
are “radical” in nature.57 A radical dissent “is one that critiques the authorized version of the
historical, political and cultural portrait set up by the trial and creates a civic space for counter48 See for example, Ruth Bader GINSBURG, “Remarks on Writing Separately” (1990) 65:1 Washington Law Review

133.
49 Donald R. SONGER, John SZMER, and Susan W. JOHNSON, “Explaining Dissent on the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2011) 44:2 Canadian Journal of Political Science 389.
50
R. P. ANAND, “The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication” (1965) 14:3 The
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 788; Neha JAIN, “Radical Dissents in International Criminal Trials”
(2017) 28:4 European Journal of International Law 1163; Jeffrey L DUNOFF and Mark A POLLACK,
“International Judicial Practices: Opening the Black Box of International Courts” (2018) 40:1 Michigan Journal of
International Law 47.
51 Dunoff and Pollack, supra note 50 at 81–6, 89–101.
52 Anand, supra note 50 at 804–5.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., at 805.
55 Hemi MISTRY, “The Paradox of Dissent: Judicial Dissent and the Projects of International Criminal Justice”
(2015) 13:3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 449; Dunoff and Pollack, supra note 50 at 89–101.
56 For a greater exposition of the distinction between the different types of dissents, see Jain, supra note 50 at 1169–
72.
57 Kopelman, supra note 18 at 373; Jain, supra note 50.
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narratives to emerge and challenge the idiom in which the majority judgment speaks and which it
takes as a given.”58
Justice Pal’s “radical” dissent is significant because it examined the retroactive application of
the prohibition of war crimes, the double standards in prosecuting the Japanese and the legacies of
colonialism and imperialism in the guise of universal prosecution of various crimes by the
Japanese.59 In this manner, the dissent challenged the authorized version of the “historical,
political, and cultural” image that the Americans sought to generate with the prosecution of the
Japanese war criminals.60 More importantly, when placed within the literature, it is not at all
surprising that Justice Pal’s dissent (or the Tokyo Tribunal’s decision for that matter) was not
studied with the same eagerness as that of the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal, especially
when the international community was grappling with the genocides in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda.61 The dissent’s challenge to Western universalism of international criminal law forces
open questions about the field’s very core. This challenge, coupled with Justice Pal’s Global South
otherness then makes it easy for Western scholars writing about international accountability in
“dark corners” of world to dismiss this dissent and relegate it to annals of history.62
B. Scholarly Reception of Justice Pal’s Dissent
Justice Pal’s critique of international criminal law was academically scrutinized only recently.63
There was a return to the Tokyo Tribunal by international criminal law scholars, political scientists,
and historians in the 1990s.64 Some attention focused on the dissenting views of the judges of the
Tokyo Tribunal, especially by scholars with close ties to the Global South.65 While the return to
the Tribunal’s judgment can be viewed as an attempt to recover significant insights from the past,
there has yet to be a complete reckoning with the arguments set out in Justice Pal’s dissent by
international criminal law scholars and practitioners.66

58

Jain, supra note 50 at 1170.
Kopelman, supra note 18 at 376.
60 Jain, supra note 50 at 1170.
61 For an exception, see Kopelman, supra note 18.
62 Reynolds and Xavier, supra note 4.
63 Takeshi, supra note 2 at 127–44. Simpson, supra note 46 at 27–29; for an extensive engagement with Justice Pal’s
dissent, see Boister and Cryer, Tokyo International Military Tribunal, supra note 31.
64 Richard H. MINEAR, Victors’ Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1971); Kopelman, supra note 18; Guido SAMARANI, Article Review of “Tokyo Judgement and the Rape of
Nanking ” by Timothy BROOK, (2002) 20 Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie 174; Madoka FUTAMURA, War
Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the Nuremburg Legacy (London, United Kingdom:
Taylor & Francis Group, 2007); Totani, supra note 27 at 224–45; Tanaka, Mccormack and Simpson, supra note 2;
Boister and Cryer, Tokyo International Military Tribunal, supra note 30.
65 Ashis NANDY, “The Other within: The Strange Case of Radhabinod Pal’s Judgment on Culpability” (1992) 23:1
New Literary History 45; Melinda BANERJEE, “‘Does International Criminal Justice Require a Sovereign?
Historicising Radhabinod Pal’s Tokyo Judgment in Light of his “Indian” Legal Philosophy’” in Wui Ling
CHEAH, Tianying SONG, and Ping YI, eds., Historical Origins of International Criminal Law (Brussels: Torkel
Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2014), 64; Latha VARADARAJAN, “The Trials of Imperialism: Radhabinod Pal’s
Dissent at the Tokyo Tribunal” (2015) 21:4 European Journal of International Relations 793; Sen and Raman, supra
note 3.
66 Boister and Cryer, Tokyo International Military Tribunal, supra note 30 at 176–204.
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Rather, the dissent has sparked varying levels of academic and non-academic dismissal.67 For
example, Justice Pal’s scathing assessment of the Tribunal, in excess of 1200 pages, was
characterised as “almost schizophrenic.”68 Surprisingly, he was described as the “world’s first
mystic positivist” by a leading Western international criminal law scholar.69 It is true that there
are problematic moments within Justice Pal’s dissent and, in this vein, some commentary has
focused on Justice Pal’s unfortunate use of quotes from “the slaver Jefferson Davis” in his
conclusion.70 Others have rightly picked up Justice Pal’s “unforgiveable” and “irresponsible”
dismissal of the severity of the “reports of the Rape of Nanking (Nanjing)”71 and the more general
dismissal of Japanese violence and its effects on innocent civilians.
The sanist72 (“almost schizophrenic”) and racially charged73 (“mystic”) references are part of
the larger trend prevalent within international criminal law and other fields of public law.74 TWAIL
scholars have pointed to this larger trend endemic within the field of international criminal law,
especially in the context of race75 and voice.76 From a different point of view, Obi Okafor identified
similar trends in the construction of knowledge in the context of UN human rights commissions,
where expertise travels in a single direction from the North to South, causing a “one way traffic
paradigm.”77 Okafor’s reflection is particularly salient and helps to rationalize why Justice Pal’s
dissent was not studied, while Justice Röling’s was.78 These features of international law broadly
prompted Makau Mutua to reflect on the construction of the “savage” worthy of being saved in
2001.79 These are not unique features to international law, rather it is part of a larger form of “false
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Totani, supra note 27 at 224–239; Mark A. DRUMBL, “Memorializing Dissent: Justice Pal in Tokyo” (2020) 114
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68 Kopelman, supra note 18 at 378.
69 Simpson, supra note 46 at 27.
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71 Banerjee, supra note 62 at 37.
72 Sonia MEERAI, Idil ABDILLAHI, and Jennifer POOLE, “An Introduction to Anti-Black Sanism” (2016) 5:3
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74 Richard DELGADO, “The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want Minority
Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement” (1987) 22:2 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 301.
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2015), 49 at 54.
78 Robert CRYER, “Röling in Tokyo : A Dignified Dissenter” (2010) 8:4 Journal of International Criminal Justice
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western universalism”80 that perpetuate what Antony Anghie has characterized as the “dynamics
of difference.”81
The construction of Justice Pal as mentally ill or someone of the occult, coupled with his own
promotion of prominent white supremacists like Jefferson Davies and the negation of the lived
experiences of the victims of the Japanese, then worked to assiduously dispossess his radical
claims set out in the dissent.82 Justice Pal’s pro-Japanese sympathies and his overt support of these
movements during the post-War period did not help either.83 By “disinheriting” Justice Pal, his
dissent was not able to gain any traction to become part of the larger critique of the universalism
of international criminal law.84
A handful of scholars, with a Third World sensibility, view the dissent as a “fly in the ointment
of the post-Second World War efforts at institutionalizing international justice.”85 More recently,
some have characterised Justice Pal’s dissent as “deeply suspicious of this utopian state of order
…”.86 The most interesting examinations of his dissent have focused on his Third World
perspective and animosity towards Western universalism. For example, Adil Hasan Khan has
characterized Justice Pal as deeply suspicious of universal creeds and truths: “Pal demonstrated a
‘tragic ethos’ in his persistent suspicion of assertions of a ‘universal’ ‘international community’ in
whose name a ‘new’ truly ‘universal’ international law was sought to be authorized.”87 Yet, what
is missing from these types of critical engagement is a robust discussion of where to place Justice
Pal’s views within TWAIL. To locate his views, it is important to examine the history of TWAIL.
Antony Anghie and Bhupinder Chimni suggested that TWAIL transformed over time, and they
chronicled this evolution through two stages.88 While recognizing the challenges of anachronism
and the progress narrative built into this type of periodization89, the first generation of international
lawyers and scholars grappling with the realities of new newly independent former colonies were
gathered under the moniker of TWAIL I. The second generation of TWAIL scholars have sought
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Sujith XAVIER, “False Universalism of Global Governance Theories: Global Constitutionalism, Global
Administrative Law, International Criminal Institutions and the Global South” Osgoode Hall Law School, PhD Thesis,
2015 at 353.
81 Antony ANGHIE, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2005).
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lived experiences of the victims of the Japanese in dissent and the promotion of white supremacist like Jefferson
Davies. Even though new understandings of the analogous nature of caste and anti-Black racism is available, I am
unable to reconcile how Justice Pal could advocate for racial equality all the while electing to conclude his dissent
with the words of a known white supremacist. These incongruous positions require further study of the dissent and
Justice Pal’s perspectives. George Galindo’s discussion on anachronism is useful in this instance. See George R. B.
GALDINO, “Splitting TWAIL?” (2016) 33:3 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 37 at 44–8.
83 Totani, supra note 27 at 224-239; see also Takeshi, supra note 2.
84 Prabhakar Singh, “Reading RP Anand in the Post-Colony: Between Resistance and Appropriation” in Jochen von
BERNSTORFF and Philipp DANN, eds., The Battle for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 297 at
305.
85 Varadarajan, supra note 65 at 794.
86 Sen and Raman, supra note 3 at 232.
87 Adil Hasan KHAN, “Inheriting a Tragic Ethos: Learning from Radhabinod Pal” (2016) 110 American Journal of
International Law Unbound 25 at 26 [Khan, “Inheriting a Tragic Ethos”].
88 Anghie and Chimni, supra note 8 at 79–80.
89 Galdino, supra note 88.
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to follow in footsteps TWAIL I, all the while building new ground. More recently, Karin
Mickelson has pointed to the emergence of a third wave of TWAIL scholars and beyond.90
International law scholars like Georges Abi- Saab, F. Garcia-Amador, R.P. Anand, Mohammed
Bedjaoui, and Taslim O. Elias were important figures in TWAIL I, where the impetus was to
deploy international law as an emancipatory tool for the betterment of Third World peoples.91
Under the rubric of TWAIL I, even though 19th century international law was used to exclude nonEuropeans, there was a firm belief that international law was part of the fabric of Third World
societies. It was believed that international law’s power could be harnessed for good. Importantly,
there was an emphasis on sovereign equality of nations, underscored by the firm belief in
international law. TWAIL II scholars, while travelling on the same path, elected to break new
ground by developing “powerful critiques of the Third World nation-state, of the processes of its
formation and its resort to violence and authoritarianism”.92 By looking at the theory and doctrines
of international law, scholars writing in this vein sought to clearly demarcate the racial hierarchy’s
endemic within international law, placing an emphasis on the lived experiences of the peoples of
the Global South.93 More importantly, by using history, they sought to connect international law
to its civilizing mission and its colonial past.94 The next generation of TWAIL scholars are pushing
further ground and are making “sweeping indictment(s) of international law”95, all the while
building bridges between marginalized communities through “praxis of place” for example.96
Justice Pal’s dissent then can be situated within the first group of international law jurists. In
coming to his conclusion of not guilty, there are two central themes that scaffold Justice Pal’s
dissenting view. The first is the double standards of the decision to prosecute, indict, and ultimately
find culpable Japanese officials.97 The second is the pure politics of victors’ justice.98 The former
theme manifests throughout his reasons with repeated references to colonial endeavours of the
90
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92 Ibid., at 83.
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94 Ibid.
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of Access to Justice v at vii. See also Xavier and Hewitt, supra note 7.
97 See for example Justice Pal’s discussion of “[w]hether the war of the alleged character became criminal in
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Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 71-639 paras 48414-49858.
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Allies, and how they in fact engaged in aggressive war in various parts of the world, before and
during World War II. These forms of violence were clearly overlooked, while the Japanese were
prosecuted. The second interrelated theme of victors’ justice is littered throughout Justice Pal’s
dissent with references to the atrocities arising out of the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. These themes work to assiduously expose the double standards of the charges laid
against the Japanese. They are scaffolded throughout the analysis in setting out the problems with
the competency of the established Tribunal and the meaning and scope of the law that the judges
sought to apply. In pursing the legality of Japan’s conduct, Justice Pal deploys various opinions of
legal experts ranging from Manley Hudson, Hans Kelsen, Hersch Lauterpacht, Aron Trainin, and
others to parse through the veracity of the prosecution’s case against the accused. Throughout his
analysis, there are robust discussions on for instance individual criminal responsibility99 and
customary international law100 all the while gesturing to the possibility of a future in which
international law can be emancipatory.
Justice Pal’s dissent is predicated on the sovereign equality of Japan and its conduct within the
then existing framework of international law that he sought to apply. The dissent falls squarely
within the first generation of TWAIL scholars. By locating the dissent in this context, some of the
fault lines within Justice Pal’s thinking become easier to trace, and place as well. More importantly,
doing so allows for a fuller nuancing of the Justice Pal’s decision where we can identify some of
the commonalities, all the while troubling the erasures of for example the lived experiences of the
victims and the problematic, questionable and racist citational practices.101
In the next section, I take up Justice Pal’s unique perspective on institutional powers granted to
the judges of the Tokyo Tribunal to amend the rules of evidence and procedure. By focusing on
the relevant sections on proceduralism and evidence in his reasons, I will exemplify the dangers
of othering his radical dissent, further cementing my argument Justice Pal remains a relevant figure
in international criminal law.
II. ENDURING LEGACIES OF JUSTICE PAL’S CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES:
JUDGES QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS, PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES &
TRUTH
Justice Pal’s dissent is a complex multifaceted intervention that confronts central fault lines in the
creation of the Tokyo Tribunal. Importantly, the dissent challenges the reasoning in the majority
decision to render culpable Japanese public officials. A unique aspect of Justice Pal’s dissent is
the focus on the everyday practices of the Tribunal and the examination of the rules of evidence
and procedure. Justice Pal took issue with the flexibility of the rules and its impact on the daily
operation of the Tribunal. He presented the issue by chronicling the effects of the judges’ powers
to draft and amend the rules as means to expedite the daily proceedings, the various procedural
irregularities, and the determination of truth via witness testimony. These three conceptual
challenges then work to reinforce the broader Third Worldist critique central to his dissent: double
standards and victors’ justice.
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TWAIL scholars have devoted much effort to exposing the embedded racial hierarchies and the
double standards in international law generally, and international criminal law in particular.102 The
themes of double standards and victors’ justice that scaffold Justice Pal’s dissent are prominently
featured in TWAIL scholarship on international criminal law’s theory, doctrine, and institutional
design. In 2003, Anghie and Chimni signalled to their serious concerns with the creation of the
two international criminal tribunals by the UN Security Council using its Chapter VII powers, as
opposed to creating these tribunals through bilateral treaties.103 More broadly, Anghie and Chimni
worried that these two tribunals would retroactively apply law.104 They argued that the Tribunals’
singular focus on individual criminal responsibility shifts the blame away from state actors and
international institutions. State actors and international institutions for example had contributed to
the fermenting of ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.105
More recently other TWAIL scholars have pursued similar broad critiques of the doctrine,
theory, and the institutional DNA of the ICC, as I alluded to at the outset of this paper. For example,
some scholars have explored the selectivity of prosecution in international criminal law106 and the
“operational selectivity” of cases by the ICC.107 These scholars worried about the focus on the
African war criminal to the exclusion of the Israeli and Sri Lankan Sinhala war criminals.108 While
these interventions take apart the prominent doctrines, theory, and institutional design, there is
more work to be done on the specific applicable rules of evidence and procedure in international
criminal proceedings from a TWAIL perspective.109 Such a gap is not unique to TWAIL. There is
more room for mainstream international criminal law scholars to examine the specific application
of the rules of evidence and procedure.110 Even within the mainstream scholarship, there are only
a handful of interventions that have taken a noticeably critical approach to the application of the
rules of evidence and procedure.111
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In adopting a “Nuremberg legal sensibility”,112 the two ad hoc tribunals replicated the double
standards that Justice Pal contested in his dissent of the Tokyo Tribunal. The double standards that
Justice Pal was concerned with was the prosecution of the Japanese, all the while ignoring the
colonial violence of the Allies. He was particularly vexed by the lack of prosecution of those
responsible for the atomic bombs. These double standards then worked to fuel a form of victors’
justice (notwithstanding the support of China and other newly impendent Global South states).113
Fast forwarding to the ICTY and ICTR, there are instances of double standards built into the
prosecutorial process and beyond. For example, the then ICTY prosecutor, Carla del Ponte’s
decision not to prosecute NATO leaders in the commission of international crimes was described
as an “amateur whitewash” by one commentator.114 The leaders of the Rwandan Patriotic Front
were not prosecuted either.115 In this paper, I pick up on the double standards embedded within the
rules of evidence and procedure. On the one hand, the statutes are clear in enshrining the rights of
the accused and ensuring a fair and transparent adjudicatory process. On the other, when we peer
into the anatomy the rules, there is something wholly different. The double standards then work to
reinforce the existing racial hierarchies (especially in the case of the ICTR) and further entrench
the North South divide. Accordingly, my analysis focuses on the rules and their impact, rather than
exploring the specificities of the rights of the accused.116
The rules of evidence and procedure within a criminal proceeding are of the utmost importance,
especially given the impact such a decision may have on the accused. While the evidentiary
thresholds are much lower in for example non-criminal proceedings117, the presumption of
innocence is an essential part of international criminal prosecution. The Chief Prosecutor of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, Robert Jackson is noted to have said “[t]he ultimate principle is that you
must put no man on trial under the forms of judicial proceedings if you are not willing to see him
freed if not proven guilty.”118
In this vein, I explore the enduring legacy of Justice Pal’s dissent with a particular focus on the
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICTY Rules) and the ICTR Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (ICTR Rules) from a TWAIL perspective. In the following sections, I trace the evolution
of the powers of the judges to draft and amend their respective rules of evidence and procedure. I
locate the origins of these powers to Robert Jackson, the Nuremberg Tribunal and a “Nuremberg
legal sensibility.”119 In the following three sections, I expose the effects of these powers and how
they generate double standards through the available procedures of international criminal
112
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prosecution. In this vein, I first chronicle the problems of making changes to the rules on an
everyday basis and then I turn to examine the impact of hearsay evidence.
A. Critique of the Institutional Powers of the Judges
Several problems plagued the Tokyo Tribunal, starting with General MacArthur’s heavy-handed
role in its creation.120 The Tokyo Tribunal’s Charter provisions ensured that the Japanese accused
were prosecuted quickly and efficiently, with fairly relaxed evidentiary rules.121 The nine rules of
procedure accompanying the Charter were rather superficial as well, especially for an international
criminal trial that would eventually convict and deploy capital punishment on those deemed
culpable. The powers allocated to the judges to amend the rules of evidence and procedure
moreover caused day-to-day operational problems.122 Approximately 45 years later, identical
problems were evident in the day-to-day operations of the two ad hoc international criminal
tribunals, created by the United Nations Security Council.
The United Nations Security Council established the ad hoc tribunals on the heels of the
findings of the commissions of experts tasked with investigating the violent conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively.123 Similar to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the
ICTY and ICTR statutes delineate the applicable international crimes,124 the organisational
structure of the respective tribunal, and tribunal composition.125 Importantly, they follow the
Nuremberg Tribunal’s approach to the rules of evidence and procedure. The ICTY and ICTR
statutes allowed judges to draft the rules of evidence and procedure,126 and the judges then
120
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designed the amendment process through their respective rules.127 It is important to note that the
ICC Statute did not, however, follow this model.128 The enabling statute of the ICC, Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, was drafted differently. Article 51 of the Rome Statute
explicitly guarantees that amendments to the rules of evidence and procedure are only possible
with a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of States Parties.129
In this section, I trace the origins of the “quasi legislative” powers of the judges to draft and
amend the rules of evidence and procedure to Robert Jackson and the Nuremberg Tribunal.130 By
modelling the ICTY Rules and ICTR Rules on the Nuremberg Tribunal and granting quasilegislative powers to the judges, Justice Pal’s concerns about the double standards and unfairness
would continue. What I argue below is that providing judges with liberal procedural powers does
not lead to expeditious trials. Inversely, the judges attempt to be expeditious in fact caused further
trial delays. By chronicling the origins and effects of these quasi-legislative powers, Justice Pal’s
dissenting view that a liberal approach to the rules did not lead to happy results becomes all the
more relevant. In fact, these are the same exact concerns that TWAIL scholars set out vis-a-vis the
double standards in the “selection of cases” and “operational selectivity”, albeit in the doctrinal
and institutional context.131 Importantly, this discussion on the powers to amend then forms the
backdrop to more insidious forms of double standards that I chronicle in the following discussions
on procedural irregularities and the determination of truth.
1. Judicial Power to Draft and Amend the Rules: Inheriting “Utmost Liberality”
Evidentiary and procedural rules are the backbone of an international criminal tribunal and are
essential in setting out how the institution performs its basic function: the determination of truth
and culpability. To that effect, article 7 of the Tokyo Tribunal Charter was modelled on the
Nuremberg rules of evidence and procedure.132 This provision allowed the judges to draft and
amend their rules, provided it was consistent with the Charter. The Tokyo Tribunal Charter
moreover offered further guidance to the judges on how to conduct the trial (article 12) and receive
evidence (article 13 & article 15 (d)). In dealing with the admissibility of evidence, article 13 (a)
enabled the Tribunal to move beyond technical rules of evidence and proclaimed: “It shall adopt
and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit
any evidence which it deems to have probative value …”133 Expeditiousness, as part of the Allies
127
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efforts to deliver victors’ justice quickly, was thus built into the Charter. Judges were granted these
“quasi-legislative” powers to ensure that the proceedings were expedited.134
Importantly, the idea of expeditious trials can be traced back to the drafting of the Nuremberg
Charter. The discussions recorded by Robert Jackson through his meticulous notes on the
International Conference on Military Trials (June to August 1945) illustrate the importance of
expeditious proceedings. To this effect, Jackson made the following statement: “We do not want
technical rules of evidence designed for jury trials to be used in this case to cut down what is really
and fairly of probative value, and so we propose to lay down as a part of the statute that utmost
liberality shall be used”.135 The Russian General Nikltchenko responded in agreement in the
following manner: “We think it is perhaps very advisable to remind the judges that there may be a
possibility of attempts by the Fascists to use the courts as a sounding board for accusing the Allies
of imperial designs.”136 This approach to the rules of evidence and procedure at Nuremberg then
travelled to the Tokyo Tribunal via Robert Jackson and General MacArthur. It is certain what
emerges from the Tokyo majority decision, the dissenting reasons, and the ensuing academic
commentary that the desire for expeditious processes was spurred on by victors’ justice. This
would eventually make its way, many years later to the two ad hoc tribunals.
The “liberality” approach to the rules caused significant concern for the Tokyo Tribunal defence
lawyers. They worried about the judicial determination of probative value afforded to their
evidence.137 Defence lawyers were concerned that their evidence would not have the same weight
as that of the Prosecutor (as discussed in the next section 2.b). Put differently, given the criminal
nature of these proceedings, Tokyo Tribunal judges had a duty to ensure that the most relevant
evidence with probative value was accepted. In this vein and in referring to the powers granted to
the judges, Justice Pal arrived at an important conclusion in his dissent: “[T]hough the Charter
sought to make us independent of all artificial rules of procedure, we could not disregard these
rules altogether. The practical conditions of the trials necessitated certain restrictions. This
however might not have yielded happy results.”138 These unhappy results centred on the
Tribunal’s understanding and determination of probative value of evidence. In fact, Justice Pal
worried about the meaning and scope of probative value of evidence that was used to determine
the criminal culpability of the accused. To this effect, Justice Pal powerfully remarked that with
“these provisions of the Charter we admitted much material which normally would have been
discarded as hearsay evidence.”139 The ability of the judges to amend the rules, at times mid-way
through the process then reinforces the two animating themes of Justice Pal’s dissent. On the one
hand, the double standards allow the judges to direct the rules to benefit the prosecution (as I reveal
in section 2.b) and on the other, the malleability of the rules reinforce the idea of victors’ justice,
where the outcome is certain.
As part of their “inheritance” from the Nuremberg Tribunal, similar problems arising from the
malleability of the rules of evidence and procedure can also be found within the ICTY Rules and
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ICTR Rules.140 Notwithstanding the need for expedite the proceedings, the real-life results were
the exact opposite that resulted in the double standards that Justice Pal was worried about.
2. Inheriting the Legacies of the Past: Utmost Liberality at ICTY and ICTR
Article 15 of the ICTY Statute enabled the judges to “adopt rules of procedure and evidence for
the conduct of the [...] trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and
witnesses and other appropriate matters.”141 The ICTR statute borrowed the ICTY statute’s
language on the rules of evidence and procedure.142 Drafted by the judges, the ICTY Rules consist
of 127 provisions, while the ICTR Rules include 126 provisions. Slight variations aside, the
respective rules specify the required pre-trial, trial, and appeal procedures. They cover every aspect
of the tribunals’ work, from investigations to appeals. ICTY and ICTR Rule 6 allowed judges to
amend the provisions143 and unlike the rules of the Tokyo Tribunal, it established a clear
amendment process.144 The rules thus form the normative architecture that enables the tribunals to
function effectively.
For example, judges of the ICTY would gather to elect the President of the Tribunal, discuss
policy and administrative issues, and amend the rules when required through the plenary
sessions.145 These sessions were confidential, and there are no public records of the discussions
and decisions. As the tribunals started their proceedings, an Intersessional Working Group for the
Amendment of the Rules, with a panel of five judges, was established to deal with any issues. This
working group later morphed into the Rules Committee that took on the role of “a permanent
working group for the plenary of judges in respect of changes to the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.”146 The Rules Committee included three judges from the Trial Chambers, the VicePresident, and the President of the ICTY.147
Notwithstanding the cosmopolitan nature and history of the rules,148 several important
criticisms emerged as the tribunals carried on the work of international prosecutions. Certain
criticisms were concerned with the cost of justice,149 and while others focused on length of the
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proceedings.150 As a result, in April 1999 the United Nations General Assembly requested the UN
Secretary General to create an “Expert Group” to evaluate the operation of both tribunals, given
the delays in prosecution and the drain on the financial resources needed to continue the
international prosecutions.151 The Expert Group however, made a number of recommendations to
improve the daily operations of the trials.152 The main crux of the Expert Group’s report was on
the role of the judges and the adversarial system.153 Subsequently, the Expert Group’s
recommendations focused on shifting the judicial role within the Tribunals.
In response to the report, the ICTY and ICTR judges sought to tackle delays and other
inefficiencies within the adjudicatory process by turning to ‘managerial’ judging.154 They adopted
a managerial role and amended the rules of evidence and procedure in the hopes it would bring
about cost cutting and efficient processes. These reforms to the rules were precipitated by the
urgency of the UN Security Council’s completion strategy that sought to limit the length of trials
and reduce the costs of international justice.155 As illustrated earlier, the desire for expeditious
prosecutions is part of the history of international criminal prosecutions and can be traced back to
the Nuremberg Tribunal and Robert Jackson’s “utmost liberality” approach to the rules of evidence
and procedure.156 The Expert Group’s report and the UN Security Council’s completion strategy
then worked to reinforce the application of the “utmost liberality” approach within the ICTY and
ICTR.
To prevent delays, judges introduced reforms that allowed increased judicial access to case
information by amending their respective rules. Simultaneously, the reforms to the rules provided
the judges with new powers to set deadlines and work plans, thereby for example, limiting the
number of witnesses. These changes, it was argued, “would reduce the length of both pre[-]trial[s]
and trial[s].”157 In this context, the ICTY judges, for example, amended their respective rules on
48 different occasions.158 In contrast, the ICTR Rules were amended 23 times during the life of
the Tribunal.159
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The move to managerial judging did not however lead to more efficient or expeditious trials.
On the contrary, the changes with the added new steps built into the rules and the adjudicatory
process, prolonged the trials’ duration. The judges lacked specific information about their cases.
The prosecution and defence counsel resented and resisted their diminished roles. All of this led
some commentators to conclude that the “managerial judging reforms did not deliver any of their
promised outcomes.”160 As I illustrate in the following sections, these quasi-legislative powers
allowed judges to overrule previous decisions of the ICTY Appeals Chamber. These everyday
changes then generate two important issues that strike to the heart of the operationalization of the
double standards. First, judges acting on their own volition changed the rules of evidence and
procedure at various stages in the proceedings in determining the criminal culpability of an
accused.161 While it is true that the central goal of these tribunals was to prosecute the perpetrators
and render justice,162 the judicial power to amend the rules leave open questions about the scope
of the legitimate authority of judges. There are inconsistencies throughout the processes of the ad
hoc tribunals where the accused were subject to varying degrees of procedural standards. Second,
even within the most liberal account of the rule of law (whether in the domestic or international
context), an accused has the right to know the type of evidence and the process that will be used
to determine individual criminal responsibility.163 Importantly, the accused has the right to know
how the adduced evidence will be used to determine their individual criminal culpability. The
death sentences meted out by the Tokyo Tribunal illustrate the importance of safeguarding
procedural standards.
This drive for expeditious adjudicatory process formed the backdrop to Justice Pal's dissent. He
worried about the flexibility of the rules of evidence, how the procedural rules were used to
diminish the protections afforded to the accused, the impact of the Tribunal’s decision on the
accused’s individual's life and liberty and the legitimacy of the Tokyo Tribunal. 164 In a similar
manner, the move to managerial judging in the ICTY and ICTR set out in this section did not yield
quick or cheap international justice. Rather, these changes exacerbated the situation within these
two tribunals that adversely affected the rights of the accused, prolonged the proceedings, and
challenged the legitimacy of the process. In the following section, I chronicle the real daily effects
of the malleability of the rules and the impact of allowing hearsay evidence before the Tokyo
Tribunal and the two ad hoc tribunals.
B. Procedural irregularities at the Tokyo Tribunal, ICTY and ICTR: The Everyday Changes
to the Rules
The flexibility of the rules described above precipitated daily procedural irregularities at the Tokyo
Tribunal and the two ad hoc tribunals. These procedural irregularities moreover can be traced back
to the notion of “utmost liberality” formulated by Robert Jackson and they would eventually travel
to the ICTY and ICTR. I set out the procedural irregularities within the Tokyo Tribunal and then
turn to the two ad hoc tribunals, focusing procedural discrepancies.
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1. Procedural Irregularities at the Tokyo Tribunal
Justice Webb commented about the controversial nature of the everyday changes to the rules by
the Tokyo Bench. In fact, he was very much alive to the effects of these procedural irregularities,
as evidenced by his comments from the bench. His reflection is worth quoting in its entirety as it
illustrates the challenges brought on by a flexible approach to the rules of procedure:
I am not here to offer any apology on behalf of the Tribunal, but as you know the Charter says we are not
bound by any technical rules of evidence. […] All we can do on each piece of evidence as it is presented is to
say whether or not it has probative value, and the decision on that question may depend on the constitution of
the court. Sometimes we have eleven members; sometimes we have had as low as seven. And you cannot say,
I cannot say, that on the question of whether any particular piece of evidence has probative value you always
get the same decision from the seven judges as you would from eleven. I know that you would not… You
cannot be sure of what decision the court is going to come to on any particular piece of evidence not absolutely
sure- because the constitution of the court would vary from day to day and I would be deceiving you if I said
decisions did not turn on how the court was constituted from time to time. They do. On the other day in court
on an important point I know the decision would have been different if a Judge who was not here was present.
How are we to over-come that. We cannot lay down technical rules. We might spend months in trying to agree
upon them and then fail to reach an agreement. The Charter does not allow us to adopt them in any event. It is
contrary to the spirit of the Charter. The decision of the Court will vary with its constitution from day to day.
There is no way of overcoming it.165

The inheritance of Robert Jackson’s approach of “utmost liberality” to the rules of evidence and
procedure from the Nuremberg Tribunal then had a significant impact on the day-to-day operations
of the Tokyo Tribunal.166 Justice Webb’s acknowledgment of the daily realities of the Tribunal
compounded an already difficult situation brought on by the flexibility built into the rules, all of
which fuelled Justice Pal’s scathing dissent. In his analysis of the Tokyo Tribunals rules, Justice
Pal was concerned with the ways in which these procedural irregularities had a significant impact
on the accused and the proceedings, depending on which judge was present on the bench on a
particular day.
For example, on 26 June 1946, defence counsel sought to cross-examine a prosecution witness
on a document that was yet to be introduced into evidence.167 The judges accepted the
prosecution’s objection. This decision was in accordance with the Tokyo Tribunal Rules.168 Three
days later, the Tribunal made a similar decision. In this instance, when cross-examining a
Prosecution witness, defence counsel asked questions based on another yet to be introduced
document. The prosecution objected as the document needed to be served 24 hours in advance.
The judges again accepted this objection. Notwithstanding these rulings, when the prosecution
attempted to rely on yet-to-be introduced documents in cross-examination, the Tribunal departed
from its two earlier decisions in June. In fact, the Tribunal noted that “the rule as to processing and
serving a copy of the document in advance did not apply.”169
These procedural inconsistencies animated Justice Pal’s dissent and his specific focus on the
construction of the rules, the application of the procedure and ultimately, their negative impact on
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the proceedings. In fact, these types of irregularities where the judges of the Tribunal elect to
change the rules daily, based on what would amount to an alleged pro-prosecution bias then
assiduously reinforces the two themes that forms the bedrock of his dissent. 170 The double
standards remove the due process rights of the accused and ensures that a form of victors’ justice
is meted out.
2. Procedural Irregularities at the ICTY and ICTR
Turning to the ICTY, similar examples of these types of everyday procedural irregularities are
evident. For example, during the deposition of two witnesses in Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic,
the presiding judge informed the Chambers that one of the members of the Bench had fallen ill
and was “unlikely to be able to attend the hearings during the remainder of the week.”171 The ICTY
Statute requires three judges to serve in a Trial Chamber. Given the circumstances, the presiding
judge encouraged the parties to proceed, relying on Rule 71. This rule allows for the appointment
of a ‘Presiding Officer’ to depose a witness “in exceptional circumstances and in the interests of
justice.”172 To the objection of the defence counsel, the prosecutor made an application to this
effect. Defence counsel objected because the witnesses would testify on specific facts relating to
the charges against the accused.173 The third judge of the Trial Chamber needed to be present to
decide if the witnesses’ testimonies were credible and to determine probative value, which goes to
the heart of the determination of guilt in the commission of an international crime. Based on the
prosecutor’s application, the two judges of the Trial Chamber decided to receive the witness
testimonies without their third colleague.174
The defence appealed the decision to include the deposed testimony. The ICTY Appeals
Chamber agreed with the accused. Relying on the ordinary meaning of the Statute, the Appeals
Chamber noted the following:
Rule 71 provides that a Trial Chamber may order that a deposition be taken, whilst Article 12 of the Statute
stipulates that a Trial Chamber shall be composed of three Judges. Given the plain and ordinary meaning of
the latter provision, a Trial Chamber is only competent to act as a Trial Chamber per se if it comprises three
Judges. Consequently, the requirement in Rule 71 that an order for depositions to be taken may only be rendered
by a Trial Chamber, has not been met. That a written decision confirming the ruling was issued by the Trial
Chamber the following day could not ipso facto cure this illegality. Where the Statute or the Rules prescribe
that a matter is to be decided by a Trial Chamber, two sitting Judges may not do so on the part of the Trial
Chamber, save in the case where the Trial Chamber has received prior authorisation by the President. Such
authorisation may, however, only be given in respect of routine matters pursuant to Sub-rule 15(E). In the
present case, no such authorisation had been given by the President, and, in any event, the making of a decision
to proceed by way of deposition with regard to the examination of witnesses giving evidence on facts relating
170
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to the specific charges made against an accused, thereby having a direct bearing on the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused, does not, in the view of the Appeals Chamber, constitute "routine matters"
within the meaning of Sub-rule 15(E).[…] The Appeals Chamber, therefore, finds that the ruling was null and
void since it was rendered without jurisdiction with regard to defence witnesses Pero Papic and Goran Males,
…175

In November 1999, the judges sitting in plenary amended Rule 15 and added Rule 15 bis (Absence
of a judge). This new rule overturned the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s five-member panel decision
in Kupreskic. In fact, Rule 15 bis was much more expansive in scope. If one of the judges is ill or
unable to attend, the new rule allowed the remaining two judges of a Trial Chamber to “continue
in the absence of that judge” (for no more than five days), if they are satisfied that doing so would
be in the “interest of justice.”176 The decision to amend the rules in this manner then worked to
overturn the Kupreskic Appeals Chamber decision to rely on the ordinary and plain meaning of
the Statute.
There are other examples in which the judges have sought to overturn their previous
decisions.177 Gideon Boas suggests that judges have overturned the chambers’ decisions in “core
areas of the law, including the procedure for the delivery of discrete sentences for each finding of
guilt by a trial chamber; amending the provisions on the right of appeal …” 178 Kupreskic and other
similar cases illustrate the broader implications of judicial inconsistency in applying the rules of
evidence and procedure in admitting evidence. These inconsistencies adversely affect, for
example, tribunal practice, tribunal jurisprudence, and importantly, the rights of the accused.
Decisions like Kupreskic highlight the problems brought about by allowing the judges to amend
the rules of evidence and procedure. Justice Pal first articulated these issues as a result of the
changes to the rules mid-way through the Tokyo proceedings as set out earlier.179 Justice Pal was
concerned with the way procedural rules were changed to allow for expeditious prosecution.
During the Tokyo Trial, the procedural guarantees were not seen as important (as I have illustrated
in the earlier section on the critique of the institutional powers of the judges). These examples then
enliven Justice Pal’s central concerns articulated 45 years before the judges of the ICTY and ICTR
started to draft and amend their respective rules.
In both instances, judges were able to change the process that sought to determine the credibility
of the witness and the veracity of their testimony midway during the proceedings. Moreover, these
changes illustrate the double standards that were built into the international criminal justice system,
that Justice Pal and many more recent TWAIL interventions have sought to challenge. In the next
section, I take up the probative value assigned to witness testimony that forms the factual basis of
the determination of truth by these three tribunals.
C. Critique of Truth: Probative Value of Witness Testimony
Beyond the everyday changes to the rules adopted by the Tribunal, Justice Pal articulated several
other important shortcomings with the Tokyo Tribunal’s determination of truth in prosecuting the
Japanese war criminals. In particular, he was deeply critical of how the Tribunal determined
175
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probative value of the 419-witness testimony and 779 witness affidavits.180 By allowing hearsay
evidence, the Tokyo Tribunal may have potentially compromised the importance of truth,
especially in the prosecution of war crimes. By adopting the practices of the Nuremberg Tribunal
as a model for the ICTY and ICTR, the “utmost liberality” approach detailed earlier is once again
visible and the cause of significant problems in meting out justice for the genocide in Rwanda and
the former Yugoslavia, respectively. In the following section, I set out Justice Pal’s concerns with
hearsay evidence and trace the effects of allowing hearsay at the ICTR.
1. Hearsay Evidence at the Tokyo Tribunal
In exposing some of the fundamental flaws of the determination of probative value, Justice Pal
focused on the use of the diary of Koichi Kido and the Saionji-Harada memoir by the Tokyo
Tribunal’s prosecutors. Kido held several important ministerial positions within the government
of Japan. He served as the adviser to the Emperor, the Lord Keeper of the Privacy Seal.181 During
the proceedings, Kido’s diary, which covered 1930 to 1945, was introduced as evidence. The
prosecution relied on the diary because of Kido’s role within the government and his dealings with
other Japanese officials at that time.182 The diary was used to substantiate conversations that Kido
had with Japanese officials facing similar charges.183 Justice Pal was however worried about the
trustworthiness of the diary. He thus noted: “[w]hen, however, the author proceeds the whole
course either of a life or any event, there may come an unconscious influence of his creation which
may greatly affect the record detracting from its initial trustworthiness.”184
Similarly, Justice Pal was concerned about the prosecution’s use of Saionji-Harada’s memoir
to construct their respective case against the accused.185 The memoir was introduced into evidence
by the prosecution as part of its rebuttal evidence. The memoir reported various conversations with
different Japanese officials during the war, as experienced and chronicled by the secretary to Prince
Kimmochi Saionji, Baron Harada.186 These accounts were transcribed by Baron Harada’s
stenographer. Harada dictated the text from 1930 to 1940, based on his interactions with various
government personnel.187 These notes were then reviewed by Harada and later corrected by Prince
Saionji.188
For Justice Pal, the hearsay evidence in the memoir had an insidious effect that made the entries
completely “worthless.” 189At times, Harada was not present when these statements were made.
More importantly, the accounts of the author were edited by Prince Saionji, 190 even though he was
not part of these conversations. Subsequently, this portion of the dissent focused on the nature of
the evidence, prompting the following crucial reflection by Justice Pal: “I for myself find great
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difficulty in accepting and acting upon evidence of this character in a trial in which the life and
liberty of the individuals are concerned.”191

2. Hearsay Evidence at the ICTY and ICTR
Similarly, hearsay evidence was allowed through the ICTY Rules and ICTR Rules. Rule 89 of the
ICTY and ICTR sets out the framework to adduce evidence.192 In particular, this provision adopts
a ‘free proof approach’ where the trial chamber admitted any evidence with probative value.193
There was no clear, consistent, and discernible practice on admitting evidence though.194 Both the
ICTY and ICTR admitted hearsay evidence since their inception,195 albeit with some caution.196
The tribunals’ jurisprudence suggest that each chamber had to be satisfied with evidence's
reliability, “given the content and character of the evidence for it to be admitted.”197 The tribunals
recognized the limited probative value of hearsay evidence. For example, in Bagosora, the ICTR
Trial Chamber noted that “there are limited avenues for testing the reliability of this [hearsay]
particular evidence.”198
Various scholars have examined witness testimony before the two ad hoc tribunals.199 Like
Justice Pal, these scholars were particularly worried about false witness accounts and possibilities
of perjury.200 For example, Alexander Zahar chronicled perjury in the 2006 ICTR Trial Chamber
decision in Rwamakuba. The ICTR may have opted for a relaxed approach to witness testimony,
recognizing the context in which witnesses testified.201 The passage of time and witness trauma
may have contributed to witnesses’ fading memories. Due to the horrific nature of the Rwandan
genocide, these were practical realities with which the Tribunal had to grapple with.
In an analogous manner, Nancy Combs pinpointed significant dangers in using hearsay
evidence in 2010 by examining the trial transcripts from the ICTR.202 In this ground-breaking
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study, Combs points out several problems that the ICTR faced. For example, how to contend with
a Rwandan eyewitness with different socio-cultural practices? As a result, “[i]n sum, Trial
Chambers often seem content to base convictions on highly problematic witness testimony.”203
This was because the witnesses were unable to provide detailed accounts of the dates, times, and
specific locations of the events they were attesting to.204 More importantly, based on Combs’
careful review of trial transcripts, the ICTR witnesses could not place the accused accurately at the
scene.205 This is a necessary and essential requirement for individual criminal responsibility.
Throughout the life of the ICTY and ICTR, hearsay witness testimony was used to indict,
prosecute, and then determine the guilt of accused perpetrators of international crimes. 206 Within
the ICTR, the judges accepted problematic witness testimonies for a whole host of reasons. We
know from the history of the conflict that the Hutu perpetrators were responsible for the Rwandan
genocide. Even in instances where there are significant problems with the testimonies, Combs
suggests that the “Trial Chambers explain these [inconsistencies] away as products of the passage
of time, the frailty of memory and errors introduced by investigators and interpreters.”207
Spanning half a century, all three tribunals encountered difficulties by admitting hearsay
evidence. By exploring parallel examples from Justice Pal's dissent and the practices of the ICTY
and ICTR, I illustrated the continuing legacy of the flexible approach to hearsay evidence. In
highlighting the dangers of adduced hearsay evidence, it is prudent then to return to Justice Pal’s
words referenced earlier: “I for myself find great difficulty in accepting and acting upon an
evidence of this character in a trial in which the life and liberty of individuals are concerned.”208
III. CONCLUSION: PAL’S CONTINUED RELEVANCE TO TWAIL AND CRITIQUE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Framed as an excavation of a significant intervention in aftermath of World War II, I have argued
that Justice Pal’s dissent remains relevant, especially for scholars interested in a Third World
sensibility of international criminal law. By moving beyond TWAIL’s conceptual and institutional
challenges of international criminal law, this paper located and situated Justice Pal’s views within
the broader literature on dissent in international law and the specific academic engagement by
international law and international criminal law scholars. Importantly, while acknowledging some
of the problems within Justice Pal’s dissent, I sought to locate his views within the TWAIL
tradition. Then I examined the problematic use of the rules in the everyday practices of the Tokyo
Tribunal and the more recent international criminal tribunals set up to prosecute the most egregious
perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. Deploying an under studied facet of
Justice Pal’s dissent on the rules of evidence and procedure, I chronicled how his scathing
perspective remains relevant today, especially in light of the practices of the ICTY and ICTR. I
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did so by tracing the effects of allowing judges of these tribunals to draft and amend their
respective rules, the everyday impacts of these changes and allowing hearsay evidence.
Broadly, this paper followed in the footsteps of other TWAIL interventions on international
criminal law, challenging the various forms of western universalism and double standards. These
themes were scaffolded throughout Justice Pal’s dissent. As I have illustrated, the same themes
were part and parcel of the everyday practices of the ICTY and ICTR through the changes to their
respective rules of procedure and evidence. By examining these practices, I have sought to uncover
the embedded double standards, which are pervasive within these international criminal
institutions. There is a robust tradition within TWAIL that reconstructs and reimagines the existing
structures within international law,209 while in this paper my concern focused on uncovering as
opposed to reconstructing. Although the importance of creating ‘new legal edifices’ for the
betterment of the lives of those affected by international law and international institutions must be
acknowledged,210 one cannot ignore the calls for abolition and its continued relevance, especially
in the delivery of international justice.211
My intervention is situated within TWAIL and it is offered as means to explore how the
practices of international criminal institutions remain exclusionary and are unable to move beyond
the persistent legacies of double standards. This perspective though should not be mistaken as an
insistence on, and continued faith in, international criminal law’s ability to deliver justice. It is
impossible to displace law’s western universalism and its enduring legacies of the past. I would be
remiss not to mention that there may be no other alternative but to engage in disavowal,212 given
the very nature of law and international law in particular. The more recent calls for racial justice
have precipitated a reckoning with the law’s role in the continued subjugation of Black people,
Indigenous Peoples, and racialized peoples.213 In the same way, there is a real and urgent need to
rethink international criminal institutions and how to deliver justice to the victims of mass
violence.
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